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Abstract 
The new HTML5 standard provides much more access to 
client resources, such as user location and local data storage. 
Unfortunately, this greater access may create new security 
risks that potentially can yield new threats to user privacy 
and web attacks. One of these security risks lies with the 
HTML5 client-side database. It appears that data stored on 
the client file system is unencrypted. Therefore, any stored 
data might be at risk of exposure. This paper explains and 
performs a security investigation into how the data is stored 
on client local file systems. The investigation was undertaken 
using Firefox and Chrome web browsers, and Encase (a 
computer forensic tool), was used to examine the stored data. 
This paper describes how the data can be retrieved after an 
application deletes the client side database. Finally, based on 
our findings, we propose a solution to correct any potential 
issues and security risks, and recommend ways to store data 
securely on local file systems. 
1 Introduction 
While HTML5 is still in the process of being standardized by 
the W3C [1], its adoption will greatly help developers 
resolve recognized problems, such as media and online data 
handling; thereby providing a more robust method for 
handling data [10].  Furthermore, the enhanced 
functionalities of HTML5, such as a client-side database 
called IndexedDB (which will be embedded within the web 
browser), will provide additional benefits, such as reducing 
the web server load. However, while client-side databases 
have the advantage of reducing load on the web server, their 
performance will be dependent on the user’s web browser; 
particularly, how the browser implements the new client side 
database API; otherwise known as the IndexedDB API. 
IndexedDB is storing data on client side, which provides an 
offline functionality. This means that data can be accessed 
even without network connection. This is a big advantage 
when using mobile phone, which is bringing better batter life 
and performance. 
This paper will focus on the security of this new browser-
based storage capability, and a series of experiments will 
show how vulnerable the IndexedDB API is to attacks. These 
attacks will be described in more detail later, after which we 
will propose methods of protecting against such attacks. This 
paper will also investigate how the web application will store 
the data in the client-side database, and a series of tests will 
be conducted to retrieve the deleted database files. A possible 
solution for storing and retrieving data in secure manner will 
be proposed and described in further detail. 
The testing will use Firefox and Chrome browsers, as they 
currently support the IndexedDB client-side database. The 
investigation will focus on the data storage mechanism of the 
client-side database. To help us analyse the results, a forensic 
tool called Encase was used; Encase is an industry standard 
computer forensics tool, used in the majority of criminal 
cases involving the collection and presentation of digital 
evidence [5]. Encase is a software to access raw data, and 
provide the functionality to create disk images. 
2 Background 
The development of new Web technologies faces a trade-off 
between stronger security (thereby protecting the user), and 
increased functionality (thereby helping the user). 
Unfortunately, this trade-off may have resulted in the 
development and implementation of an insecure API, namely 
IndexedDB API. It should be noted that the implementation 
of the IndexedDB into Web browsers is not yet fully 
completed; consequently some of these security risks may no 
longer exist in future implementations of the IndexedDB 
API. The security issue with the unencrypted data stored into 
IndexeddB is considerably a structure flaw. This means that 
the database is designed to store all of the data in 
unencrypted state.  
2.1 Problem identification 
IndexedDB is storing data in unencrypted state. This 
information might not be sensitive, such as usernames or 
password, but can include client name, address, place of 
birth or date of birth.  
If some of the information is put together, then this can lead 
to identity theft.  
To prevent leaking of data all over the place, we propose an 
algorithm to secure this information, and prevent the end 
user from identity theft. 
IndexedDB also works on mobile devices, where the data is 
stored into internal phone memory. Therefore, the problem 
also exists on mobile device, which is more serious 
compared to desktop. The deleted data can be retrieved 
from any mobile device. As the data is unencrypted, the 
security issue is much higher. Considering the scenario 
where the mobile phone is lost or stolen, it will be possible 
to retrieve the deleted data. This risk of data exposure is 
much higher in this case. 
Compared to storing data on server, where data is not 
available to recover after deletion, storing on client side is 
going to be more insecure.   
2.2 Related Work 
Previous versions of HTML5 client side databases as Web 
SQL, LocalStorage lacks the encryption of data. The security 
of data stored in client side database follows the same 
principles as cookies, more details in section 3. On client side 
the only protection is firewall. Compared to storing data on 
server or cloud, the encryption is done separate [15]. As 
described, the data is stored encrypted, and will be decrypted 
only in user browser. 
2.3 IndexedDB Structure 
Files and data stored by the browser are retained on the file 
storage system, on the computer’s hard drive. The client-side 
database, IndexedDB, is a persistent client-side database, 
consequently the files reside on the user file system and can 
be recovered until they are overwritten by other files. 
IndexedDB treats file data just like any other type of data. An 
application can write a file (or Blob), into IndexedDB, as 
well as storing strings, numbers and JavaScript objects [6]. 
This is detailed in the IndexedDB specifications and, so far, 
implemented in both the Firefox and Chrome applications of 
IndexedDB. In Firefox and Chrome’s IndexedDB 
implementation, the files are stored transparently, externally 
to the actual database; the performance of storing a file in 
IndexedDB is just as good as storing it in a filesystem. It 
does not bloat the database and slow down other operations. 
Moreover, reading from the file means that the 
implementation reads from an OS file; therefore, it is just as 
fast as a filesystem. 
The Firefox IndexedDB implementation will, if it is storing 
the same Blob in multiple files, create only one copy. 
Writing further references to the same Blob just adds to an 
internal reference counter [9]. This is completely transparent 
to the web page; it writes data faster while using fewer 
resources. 
2.3 Value in Database 
Each record has a value, which could include anything that 
can be expressed in JavaScript, including: Boolean, number, 
string, date, object, array, regexp, undefined, and null. 
IndexedDB enables the storage of structured data, and unlike 
cookies and DOM Storage, IndexedDB provides features that 
enable to group, iterate, search, and filter JavaScript objects 
[6].  Each record consists of a key path and a matching value. 
These can be a simple type, such as string or date, or more 
advanced, such as JavaScript objects and arrays. It can 
include indexes for faster retrieval of records and can store 
large amount of objects.  
IndexedDB is a key-value store in the same way as Local 
storage. However, Local storage just retains strings only key; 
therefore, the usual approach to local storage is to 
JSON.stringify it. While this is suitable for finding the object 
with key uniq, the only way to retrieve the properties of 
myObject from local storage is to JSON.parse the object and 
examine it. IndexedDB can store data other than strings in 
the value, including simple types such as DOMString and 
Date as well as Object and Array instances [10]. 
Furthermore, it can create indexes on object properties 
containing a specific value. So while IndexedDB can hold 
the same one-thousand objects, it can also create an index on 
the b property and use that to retrieve only the objects where 
b==2 without having to scan every object in the store.  
Furthermore, IndexedDB is aware of ranges; therefore, it can 
search and retrieve all records beginning with 'ab' and ending 
with abd' in order to find 'abc' etc.  
IndexedDB is implemented differently across browsers. 
Firefox uses SQLite and Chrome LevelDB.  It should be 
noted that LevelDB is not a SQL database. Like other 
NoSQL and Dbm stores, it does not have a relational data 
model, it does not support SQL queries, and it has no support 
for indexes.  
IndexedDB is implemented in the browser on top of another 
database. This mean that it does not work on its own, as it is 
an API layer. IndexedDB is storing the value in local 
filesystem, which means that the limit of storage is limited to 
space on user hard drive. When compared to other databases, 
IndexedDB is updating the whole data rather that just the bits 
of specific data values.  
3 Potential attack vector 
This section is considering an unauthorized physical access 
attack to IndexedDB file, from outside the user local 
machine. 
3.1 CORS (Cross-origin resource sharing) Attack 
CORS is a mechanism that allows JavaScript on a web 
page to make XMLHttpRequests to another domain, not the 
domain the JavaScript originated from. Normally, web 
browsers would otherwise forbid such ‘cross-domain’ 
requests. CORS defines a way in which the browser and the 
server can interact to determine whether or not to allow the 
cross-origin request [12]. By letting third party applications 
accessing the data created with other domains application can 
lead to security issues, such as information leakage. 
Therefore user agents must implement Cross-origin resource 
sharing with IndexedDB in greater security details. Also, in 
some CORS should not be allowed, to protect the privacy of 
the end user. 
 
Scenario 1: Unauthorized physical access to the OS file 
system, where the data from the browser database 
(IndexedDB) is stored unencrypted. 
 
CORS expands on the design of the Same Origin Policy. 
Each resource declares a set of origins, which are able to 
issue various kinds of requests (such as DELETE, INSERT, 
UPDATE) to, and read the contents of, the resource. CORS 
is a “blind response” technique controlled by an extra HTTP 
header (origin), which, when added, allows the request to 
reach the target. This means, that an application creates an 
IndexedDB database, which is saved with the domain name. 
Another application cannot access the database files, as the 
access is restricted for the particular domain.  This attack is 
based on bypassing the Same Origin Policy and establishing 
cross-domain connections to allow the deployment of a 
Cross-site Request Forgery attack vector [11]. 
 
Scenario 2 (Data Breach): Unauthorized access from an 
external machine (bypassing the Same Origin Policy (SOP)) 
to read the data and retrieve the information stored in the 
IndexedDB files.  
But why is the ability to read and retrieve data stored in the 
IndexedDB files such an issue.  In order to demonstrate the 
problem, we will firstly conduct an analysis of the 
IndexedDB database file. 
4 Analysis of indexeddb database file 
 
The first step in conducting this analysis is to build a ‘clean’ 
Hard Disk Drive (HDD) on a PC [HP Z400 6-DIMM with 
12GB RAM and XEON 4 physical cores (8logical cores)] 
that will include the operating system (Windows 7, 64-bit) 
and web browsers (Firefox v.20.0.1; Chrome 
v.29.0.1547.620) after which some initial Internet browsing 
will be conducted. The HDD will then be ‘acquired’ using 
Encase v.6.11.1.  This will be the starting point for each 
investigation. After each experiment, the image needs to be 
restored to a ‘clean’ state, and following each experiment, the 
disk will be forensically wiped, and then same component 
(operating system, web browsers) will be installed. 
The aim of these experiments is to investigate and show how 
the data is deleted from IndexedDB (local file) and also if the 
data is in unencrypted state. We will also perform an reuse of 
recovered file and show, if it can be successfully achieved. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1: RECOVERY OF DELETED INDEXEDDB SQLITE 
DATABASE FILE 
In this experiment, the SQLite database file will be deleted 
from a Hard Disk Dive (HDD), in a PC [HP Modified to i5 
processors and 16GB Ram] running a Windows 7 64-bit 
Operating System.  Then using Encase v.6.11.1, locate the 
deleted data and perform a data recovery. The structure of the 
web browsers (Firefox v.20.0.1 and Chrome v.29.0.1547.62) 
will also be examined to assess how the data is stored. 
EXPERIMENT 1: RESULTS 
 
Firefox stores all data in a temporary table (SQLite database) 
from where the data is copied into an Object Store, complete 
with key/value link. After the data has been copied 
successfully, the temporary table is dropped. The browser 
always stored the SQL file in the same location in the file 
system. On Firefox the location is C:\Users\[user-
name]\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[profile 
name.default]\indexedDB\[domain-name]\[database-name]  
where on Chrome C:\Users[user-
name]\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default\IndexedDB. Consequently, and previously 
stored data is always overwritten. Interestingly, when the 
data is deleted from the application (using delete function), 
the location within the file system is reserved for that deleted 
file. It is keeping the reserved location, because the deleted 
file still persists on the HDD. So when running the 
application again, the browser always allocates a different 
location for the newly created Object Store.  
 
Allocation of file storage in Chrome is slightly different; all 
of the databases are stored in the same file. Consequently, it 
is assumed that Chrome is using compression for storing 
browsing data. 
 
In Encase we choose the option for Copy/UnErase the 
deleted file. This exported the deleted file with all the data.  
While the deleted file data can be read from Encase, we 
choose to export the file and opened with SQLite Manager 
(Figure 1). In this way all the data in table was visible, and 




Figure 1: Exported deleted database file. 
EXPERIMENT 2: CLEARING THE BROWSER CACHE 
 
Experiments in Firefox will include deleting the data by 
clearing the browser cache (deleting the offline data option). 
Each experiment will store 300K records with a file size of 
127MB. Experiments in chrome will include deleting the 
data by clearing the browser cache (clearing browsing data- 
Hosted app date). Each experiment will store 300K records 
with a file size of 128MB. 
EXPERIMENT 2: RESULTS 
 
Clearing the browser cache in Chrome clears the databases 
and deletes the file where it is stored. 
In Firefox the clearing the cache does not delete the database 
file from local file system. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3: REUSE OF RECOVERED INDEXEDDB 
DATABASE 
 
In this experiment the possibility of reusing a recovered 
IndexedDB database in a different web browser was 
investigated.  This involved identifying the location (physical 
address on the HDD), of the file after it had been deleted.  In 
addition, this experiment also considered if the database 
name is changed after it has been deleted; to see if the Web 
application can read deleted file with different filename. 
When deleting a database from the application, everything in 
the folders is deleted; including those that can be stored 
locally (image, document, video, audio).  
SQLite is not a typed database, which means that any data 
type can be put into any cell, regardless of the type declared 
for the column, and the database will attempt to convert it. 
Similarly, a different type than the column type is requested, 




Figure 2: The physical address, and data in database file. 
EXPERIMENT 3: RESULTS 
 
Figure 2 displays the physical address of the file before and 
after deletion. Also the physical address of the newly created 
database file persists on the same location.  The deleted files 
are marked with red cross. This file was restored with Encase 
and exported to another hard drive.  The file was restored 
into database folder, and application was run to check if the 
data could be accessed.  The result is that the application read 
the file and all of the data in unencrypted state was available 
for us to see.  
5   Analyses and Possible Solution 
The results were as expected; the deleted data has been 
marked as deleted, but it can be exported and all the 
information inside the database could be read.  Moreover, 
exported data that has been imported to another PC running 
Windows 7 can be accessed and re-used.  However a possible 
solution to this security issue is presented below. 
5.1 A Proposed Solution to Security issue in IndexedDB 
In this section we are going to propose a solution to 
IndexedDB storage security issue.  
The prevention against such scenarios might include 
encryption of the files stored by the browser on the file 
system. All the data stored by the browser will be encrypted 
and stored to the file system. When retrieving the data, a 
secure key will be required to read the data from the file 
system. An encryption library will generate this key, which 
will permit access to read the data. Otherwise, the data 
remains encrypted and impossible to read.  The encryption 
key will be downloaded dynamically and the key (password) 
will be stored in session key. When the key is secure, then it 
will encrypt data. When a user closes browser, then the key is 
overwritten in RAM. This will help to prevent attacker 
getting access to secure key when reading data from RAM. 
 
The algorithm to secure saving of data could be a JavaScript 
library (proposed Stanford JS Encryption library), which will 
help us to prevent saving data in unencrypted state. 
We going to explain steps to write, update and read the data 
with algorithm in pseudo code. 
 




trough OAuth - The first step is to provide a secure 
login functionality, which can be provided by web 
application. The web application will use the login to 
authenticate a user and securely logged the user into 
system. 
2. Open a connection to database - When an 
application requests a new transaction for IndexedDB to 
open database and save data, the designed encryption 
library extension will encrypt the data. This way the data 
will be stored in an encrypted state and not readable to 
others.  
3. Encryption library generates public and private 
key - When the data is encrypted a key will be generated 
and stored with the user information on server. Client-
side encrypts sensitive data using the public key, which 
will be generated and stored on sever side. This public 
key is used when encrypting information using the 
JavaScript library.  
Public and private key are created simultaneously using 
the same algorithm (RSA- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman). 
4. Encrypt data - When Client-side encryption is enabled, 
an RSA keypair is generated and user will be given a 
specially formatted version of the public key. RSA is the 
algorithm that is used to encrypt data with a private key 
to produce a digital signature [13]. The private key, 
however, is never revealed to user or anyone else. Once 
the data servers, the data is decrypted using the keypair’s 
private key [14]. Private key is used to decrypt text that 
has been encrypted with public key. It uses the industry-
standard AES algorithm at 128, 192 or 256 bits; the 
SHA256 hash function; the HMAC authentication code. 
5. Save the file and close the connection 
 
When reading the data, the following steps needs to be 
fulfilled. 
 
1. Checking user credentials - When the user request the 
read the data from database, the web application will 
check user credentials (if the session is active) and get the 
key from server to allow decryption of data.  
2. Get the key to decrypt data ‐ Upon successful 
authentication user will be given a public key, which will 
be used for decryption of the data. This private key will 
be stored on server side, with all the user information, 
which is used for decrypt the data. We are going to use 
OAuth 2, which is an open standard for authorization. 
This will be used to securely transfer private key to 
server. 
3. Decrypt  Data  –  Encryption library will check for 
matching combination of private and public key, and 




For a secure authentication with server we are going to 
consider OAuth. This will provide authentication between 
the application and web server using a security token. We do 
not consider security issues with OAuth, because this will be 
done in later stage, when the implementation is done. 
The data is stored unencrypted to file system, which can be 
accessed by the web application. When an application send a 
request to web browser to store the data on local file system, 
the cryptography library will encrypt the data, to be stored 
secure. A secure key will be also generated and stored on 
web server.  Reading the data from local file system will be 
possible only when a secure key is provided and the 
authentication between web application and server is 
established. Considering all of the points are made and 
connection is securely established, the data is decrypted by 
cryptography library and displayed trough web browser to 
user. In fig. 3 we highlight the proposed solution showing 
how the cryptography library will be implemented. The 
library will be implemented on top of web browser API.  It 
should be noted, that at this stage this solution is only 
theoretical, however further work will be undertaken to prove 
this hypothesis. 
 
The algorithm will consist of the following components, 
which are build into browser (Figure 4).  
 
• Mechanism for generating private and public key 




 Figure 3: Proposed Encryption Library 
 
 
Figure 4: Encryption and decryption using keys 
 
Encryption/Cryptography library is a piece of software or 
code, which encrypts readable text into unreadable data. This 
data can be accessed by using an encryption key. Some 
examples of encryption libraries are listed below. These are 
just few encryption libraries, which are considered for 
implementation into browser. This libraries were chosen, 
because provide the functionality to encrypt on client side, 
and also are available as open source. 
 
OpenSSL: Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer 
Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general 
purpose cryptography library [4]. 
 
Crypto++: A free C++ library for cryptography: includes 
ciphers, message authentication codes, one-way hash 
functions, public-key cryptosystems and key agreement 
schemes [2]. 
 
GPGME: (GnuPG Made Easy) a C language library that 
allows support for cryptography to be added to a programme. 
It is designed to provide easier access to public key crypto 
engines like GnuPG or GpgSM. GPGME provides a high-
level crypto API for encryption, decryption, signing, 
signature verification and key management [7]. 
 
BeeCrypt: A C++ API cryptography library [3]. 
 
Libgcrypt: GNU's basic cryptographic library [8]. 
 
Off course, another possible solution to problem might 
include usage of an external device to store data from a 
browser. For example, a user could specify to a location to 
which any IndexedDB files should be stored when browsing 
the web or running some applications. This includes an 
option where the data could be written and read from an 
external source, such as USB. The USB key will need to be 
secured with access encryption and restricted to access data 
when the master password is entered. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have demonstrated security related flaws 
within IndexedDB. While the browser can delete IndexedDB 
files stored on the local filesystem, they can be retrieved by 
Encase. Unfortunately, the retrieved data is in an 
unencrypted format, and given the nature of the data held 
within the IndexedDB API, a potential security issue exists. 
All the data in IndexedDB is exposed. We have demonstrated 
a solution for this security issue, which includes a secure 
‘library’, located between the browser and the filesystem. All 
data stored by the Indexed DB application will be encrypted 
and saved to the library. Therefore, if the application needs to 
read the data, an encryption key will be required. Without a 
key, the data will not be decrypted and reading the data will 
not be possible. This will help to secure the data stored on the 
client side and prevent retrieval in an unencrypted state. 
Future work will focus on implementing the cryptography 
library into web browser and testing for possible attacks. 
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